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Abstract: 
Since the end of the Cold-War, the field of transitional justice has metamorphosed 
from an initially narrow focus on justice and retribution to a much more complex study of 
how human rights abuses, genocide and other mass atrocities are confronted by societies 
emerging from violent conflict or transitioning to democratic forms of governance. A 
primary focus on the roles of states and institutional arrangements within states to 
confront human rights abuses has given way to much more complex understanding of 
transitional justice that incorporates various levels of analysis (international, national and 
local) and various actors of the global governance puzzle: states, IGOs, NGOs, epistemic 
communities, and global policy networks. While much scholarly attention centers on UN 
efforts to facilitate transitional justice in post-conflict settings, this paper shifts the focus 
to the European Union, a largely ignored participant in transitional justice efforts. This 
paper examines how and why the European Union develops and promotes transitional 
justice policies as part of both its enlargement strategy as well as its broader foreign and 
security policies outside the European context.   
   1 
Transitional Justice  
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional justice 
as “a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks 
recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy.”
1 Transitional justice emerged as both a field of practice and field of 
scholarly inquiry in the 1980s and 1990s in response to dramatic political changes 
occurring in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa. In each case, 
the transition to democracy included public demands to acknowledge and redress human 
rights abuses committed by former regimes. Since then, a variety of mechanisms 
developed to confront legacies of abuse (e.g. gross civil, political and other human rights 
violations, genocide and other war crimes, sexual violence, torture, disappearances) in 
times of transition, whether from authoritarianism to democracy or from war to peace. 
Such mechanisms typically fall into two categories: judicial and non-judicial. The former 
concentrates on trials (civil or criminal), either at the national or international level, or 
through special courts; the latter encompasses a range of activities, including truth 
commissions, institutional reform, amnesty, vetting, dismissals, reparations, 
rehabilitation, memorialization, reconciliation projects,
2 demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR), and more recently Security Sector Reform (SSR). Regardless of 
                                                      
1 ICTJ website, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/. Accessed January 4, 2009. 
2 “Reconciliation” is a term often found in transitional justice approaches and literature, but there is little 
consensus as to what it means and how it is achieved. ICTJ is working on establishing a commonly held 
definition to guide transitional justice efforts. To that end it endorses the civic trust model of reconciliation, 
stating that “[t]rust involves more than relying on a person to do or refrain from doing certain things; it also 
involves the expectation of a commitment to shared norms and values. The sense of trust at issue here is not 
the profound sense of trust characteristic of relations between intimates, but rather, 'civic' trust, which can 
develop among citizens who are members of the same political community but are nonetheless strangers to 
one another…In this view, reconciliation is the condition under which citizens can once again trust one 
another as citizens. That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate 
their ruling institutions; sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on this 
basis; and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens' commitment to abide by these basic norms and 
values.” See ICTJ website, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/784.html.   2 
which approach or combinations of approaches are implemented, all of them share a 
common set of mutually reinforcing goals: promoting  justice, accountability, 
reconciliation, and the rule of law; deterring future human rights violations; establishing 
democratic institutions; restoring dignity to those who suffered abuse; and memorializing 
those who perished. Thus, today one asks “…not whether something should be done after 
atrocity but how it should be done”(Nagy 2008: 276) (emphasis in original).  
Transitional justice scholarship has evolved quickly since the early 1990s.
3 
Initially, the literature focused heavily on the judicial dimensions of transitional justice, 
with legal scholars making some of the most important original contributions to the field 
(Adams 1993; Bassiouni 1996; Benomar 1993; Berat 1993; Cohen 1995; Nino 1991, 
1996; Orentlicher 1991; Pion-Berlin 1993; Roht-Arriaza 1990).Moving beyond a narrow 
legal focus the field now includes detailed analyses of the various mechanisms of 
transitional justice, including truth commissions (Berat and Shain 1995; Cassel 1993; 
Crocker 2000; Ensalaco 1994; Goldstone 1996; Hayner 1994, 1996, 2002; Medeloff 
2004; Pasqualucci 1994; Payne 2007; Van Zyl 1999; Wechsler 1990); vetting and 
lustration (Blankenburg 1995; Cepl 1993; Crossley-Frolick 2007; David 2003, 2006; 
Ellis 1996; Letki 2002; Los1995;  Offe 1993; Stinchcombe 1995; Welsh 1996); amnesties 
(Boed 2000; Du Bois-Pedain 2007; Marxen 1996; Orentlicher 1997; Roht-Arriaza and 
Gibson 1998; Sadat 2006; Stahn 2002; Wilson 2001); reparations (Asmal 1992; Barkan 
2001; Couillard 2007; De Greiff 2007; Parker and Chew 1994; Rubio-Marín and de 
Greiff 2007; Southern 1993);  public memory efforts (Barsalou and Baxter 2007; Jelin 
2007; Levinson 1998; Naidu 2006) and, more recently disarmament, demobilization and 
                                                      
3 For a survey of developments dating back to the immediate post-World War II period see Ruti Teitel, 
“Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16(2003): 69-94.    3 
reintegration (DDR) (de Greiff, 2009; Knight and Ozerdem 2004; Theidon 2007) and 
security sector reform (SSR) (Dhungana 2007; Mobekk 2006; Loden 2007). Scholars are 
also exploring previously ignored avenues of inquiry, including the role of gender in 
transitional justice (Bell, Campbell and Bell and Ní Aoláín, 2004; Bell and O’Rourke, 
2007; Hamber 2007; Ní Aoláín 2006; Ní Aoláín and Rooney 2007), the linkage between 
transitional justice and economic development (Boettke and Coyne 2007; Duthie, 2008; 
Miller 2008), and local or indigenous approaches to transitional justice (Arriaza and 
Arriaza 2008; Baines 2007;  Daly 2002; Karekezi, Nshimiyimana, and Mutamba 2005; 
Lundy and McGovern 2008; Shaw 2007; Theidon 2006; Waldorf 2006).   
In spite of this impressive evolution, there are still many questions in need of 
answers. One such question revolves around the role of international organizations in 
promoting transitional justice. While some analyze UN efforts to facilitate transitional 
justice, particularly in post-conflict settings (Akhaven 1998; Bassiouni 2002; Buergenthal 
1994; Cardenal 1992; Goldstone 1997; Matheson 2002; Stahn 2002; Strohmeyer 2001a, 
2001b; Thallinger 2007; Tolbert and Solomon 2006; Wuhler 1999), the European Union 
is a largely ignored actor in the promotion of transitional justice efforts.
4  
This paper attempts to start addressing this gap by surveying EU activities to 
promote transitional justice. I start from the premise that the EU is an actor on the world 
stage, with its own unique capabilities and influence consistent with the concept of 
                                                      
4 An extensive review of the literature reveals no concerted scholarly attention to the EU’s place in the 
international landscape of transitional justice. The single exception to this is a working paper published by 
FRIDE, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, a think tank based in Madrid, 
Spain focusing on democratization, peace, security and human rights, and humanitarian action and 
development. See María Avello, “European efforts in Transitional Justice,” Working Paper 58, June 2008. 
Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros’s, “Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Coherence and 
Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil Society,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies 
on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development, eds. Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke Wierda, 
Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2009, pp. 357-389,examines the EU’s promotion of transitional justice in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.    4 
“ethical power Europe” (EPE). I argue that the EU’s promotion of transitional justice 
reflects yet another facet of its role as an ethical power placing human security concerns 
at its center.  
 
Transitional Justice in the EU-Ethical Power Europe and a Human-Centered 
Approach to Security 
 
Francois Dûchene first introduced the concept of “civilian power” as an 
international role identity for the EU in 1972 when it was still a small arrangement 
consisting of the original six member states (1972: 32-47). Dûchene and other proponents 
of the “civilian power” model, such as Maull (1990, 2000) argue that the EU’s 
uniqueness as an international actor rests on its use of diplomacy, cooperation and 
economic means to promote international stability, as opposed to military measures.  
Since Dûchene first introduced the term, several variations have emerged, including 
“normative” (Manners 2002, 2006), “civilizing” (Mitzen 2006), and “ethical” (Aggestam 
2004, 2008) power. Robert Kagan provides another variation on this theme by 
summoning the Roman goddess of love to describe the European proclivity to rely on 
international law and diplomacy (Venus) to tackle global problems, including the 
promotion of peace and stability, as opposed to a muscular military approach (Mars) 
frequently embraced by the United States (Kagan 2003).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate the finer points of difference 
between these various permutations in the discourse, or to reconcile their discrepancies in 
an effort to establish common definition. As Sjursen points out, “it is difficult to find a 
single consistent definition of ‘normative,’ ‘civilian,’ ‘ethical,’ ‘civilizing’ power 
Europe”, even if each model presupposes a normative dimension to the EU’s foreign   5 
policy (2006b: 236; 2006a: 170).   At the same time it is important to stress that by using 
the term “ethical power” I do not suggest that that EU is simply “doing good” (Aggestam 
2008: 2; Sjursen 2006a: 170). Nor do I argue that ethical powers endeavor only to use 
non-military means to achieve their ends. A preference or inclination for non-military 
instruments to address foreign policy issues does not ipso facto preclude the use of 
military force when circumstances dictate it.
5  Such binarism obscures a far more 
complicated reality revealing the EU’s well stocked foreign policy toolbox to achieve its 
foreign policy objectives. The tools fall along a continuum ranging from hard (military) 
to soft (diplomacy/trade/foreign and technical assistance). The ethical power Europe 
model acknowledges this assortment of tools, yet recalibrates our attention to ethical and 
normal considerations in determining which tools to deploy, civilian or military, and the 
changing role of military power since the end of the Cold-War (Aggestam 2008: 3). The 
fulcrum is the question of legitimacy, particularly when military means are chosen 
(Matlary 2008: 134).  The European Security Strategy (2003) underscores the need for a 
mixture of approaches in the face of new threats in the twenty-first century stating  
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely 
military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of 
instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through 
political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also 
tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, 
military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore 
order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need 
political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post 
                                                      
5 Stavri Stavridis, for example, argues that only by having a military capability can the EU succeed as a 
civilian power. See Stavridis, S. (2001) Militarizing the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe 
Revisited. The International Spectator 35: 17-21. Hans Maull’s examination of Germany’s behavior in the 
context of the Kosovo crisis indicates that conceptions of civilian power do not automatically exclude the 
possibility of military force.  It depends on the context and the willingness to modify the preexisting role 
concept “by integrating the possibility of the use of force under certain circumstances.” See Hans Maull 
(2002) German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power?’ German Politics 9, p. 18.   6 
conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis 
management helps restore civil government.
6 
 
  The EPE perspective is sensitive to a number of factors that take us further in 
understanding why the EU would advance transitional justice efforts in the first place. It 
acknowledges changes in the EU’s projection of both civilian and military power through 
the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), one of the EU’s main mechanisms for 
promoting transitional justice; it emphasizes the EU’s growing international role beyond 
the confines of Europe; it integrates the importance of ethical and normative concerns in 
formulating foreign policy with heightened attention to human rights, democracy, 
humanitarian intervention, and international criminal justice (i.e. support for the ICC and 
ending impunity for leaders accused of gross human rights violations); and it recognizes 
the important role that member states play in promoting a normatively focused agenda for 
the EU, independent of the community oriented policies such as development (Aggestam 
2008: 3-4).   
The EU’s promotion of transitional justice demonstrates both an ethical power 
role with a human-centered approach to security. First introduced in 1994 in the UN’s 
Human Development Report, the term ‘human security’ illustrates an evolving security 
paradigm “where the point of reference is the individual person and his or her right to 
personal security,” and not territory or borders (Matlary 2008:135). While the concept is 
not new, it has only recently emerged in discussions concerning the EU’s security 
paradigm. In 2004, a decade after the UNDP’s report,  the EU’s High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, requested that the Study Group on 
                                                      
6 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed December 20, 
2008.   7 
Europe’s Capabilities at the London School of Economics examine how the ESS could be 
further developed using the concept of human security as a starting point. In September 
2004 the Study Group issued its Barcelona Report entitled “A Human Security Doctrine 
for Europe.”
7 It defines human security as  
…individual freedom from basic insecurities. Genocide, wide-spread or systematic 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, and crimes against 
humanity and grave violations of the laws of war as defined in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) are forms of intolerable insecurity that breach human 
security. 
8 
 
The Report represents the first “coherent attempt to develop a policy for 
intervention based on individual rights to security—not only in terms of policy and legal 
principles…but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration” (Matlary 2008: 
139).  The insecurities that the Report highlights are precisely those that transitional 
justice mechanisms seek to address and ultimately prevent. Evaluating the ESS five years 
after its launch, the European Council continues to stress the importance of 
“mainstreaming human rights” in its ESDP missions “through a people-based approach 
coherent with the concept of human security.”
9 In the context of the EU, the human 
security approach encompasses a variety of concepts and concerns, including crisis 
management, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and transitional justice. 
 
The EU and Transitional Justice 
                                                      
7 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities, September 2004. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
9 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels 11 December 2008, p. 10. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=GA, accessed January 10, 2009. See also 
Report on Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8370_en.htm, accessed January 10, 2009.   8 
Transitional justice is a relatively new area of concern for the European Union. 
Indeed, until recently it was largely absent from EU policies promoting democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights. But that does not mean that it was ignored. It is, as Avello 
(2008: 9) asserts, “de facto part of the programme and policy of the EU.” This “de facto” 
status means that scholars of transitional justice are challenged to clarify EU 
nomenclature; identify efforts that, in retrospect, qualify as transitional justice approaches 
even if they are not labeled as such; elucidate the different meanings associated with the 
term “transitional justice;” and explain how transitional justice is operationalized in a 
variety of EU contexts. And until recently, the lack of terminological clarity made 
pinpointing exactly where transitional justice promotion is domiciled in the EU’s 
complex architecture a rather vertiginous undertaking. To further complicate matters, 
there is no specific reference to transitional justice in the corpus of treaties establishing 
the European Union.  Nonetheless, we know that transitional justice is advanced by a 
variety of actors, both horizontally across its various institutions, and vertically within the 
pillar structure. Thus, transitional justice is a cross-pillar activity with a myriad of 
financing instruments, regulations and programs that are not always coordinated in any 
obvious or perhaps meaningful way.  
 Lacking a consistent overarching framework, legal or otherwise,
10 the EU 
approaches transitional justice from primarily two perspectives. First, transitional justice 
mechanisms are nested in various policies that promote human rights, development, 
democracy, and enlargement under what is known as the Community Pillar (First Pillar) 
of the EU. In these instances, decisions are made using the so-called “Community 
                                                      
10Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner identify a similar predicament in the area of the EU’s involvement in 
Security Sector Reform (SSR). See Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, ‘Promoting Security Sector 
Governance in the EU’s Neighbourhood’, Challiot Paper no. 80, July 2005.   9 
method”: the Commission holds a monopoly on the right of initiative; the Council 
employs the qualified majority voting rule; and the European Parliament takes a more 
active role in co-legislating with the Council.  
In addition to the Community Pillar, the EU promotes transitional justice as part 
of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (Second Pillar), filtered through the prism of 
the European Security and Defense Strategy (ESDP). From this vantage point transitional 
justice mechanisms are embedded with other peace-building and security-oriented tasks, 
such as crisis-management, security sector reform (SSR), and disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR). In some cases involving peacebuilding (e.g. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), transitional justice concerns are linked with future enlargement 
scenarios. In contrast to the “Community method,” the Council plays the dominant role 
on CFSP matters. Its acts are binding, and its decisions, which often represent a greater 
intrusion on state sovereignty, rely on the principle of unanimity.  
 In spite of the differences in pillar logics and focus, EU policies promoting 
transitional justice are increasingly tailored to complement its broader security interests, 
both in Europe and beyond. These interests put a high premium on the protection of 
human rights, the promotion of democracy, and the rule of law, all of which are key to 
human security, the “new” strategic narrative for Europe (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 
2007: 273).  
 
Transitional Justice, Human Rights and Democratization under the Community 
Pillar 
Under the Community pillar the EU’s transitional justice policies are coordinated 
largely from the Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX), 
and the Directorate-General for Enlargement (DG Enlargement). Funding is often   10 
managed through EuropeAid, the Directorate-General of the Commission responsible for 
implementing external aid programs and projects around the world. Transitional justice 
mechanisms are prioritized in a number of Community programs, all of which qualify as 
development assistance. It is also pursued under the Community pillar as part of its 
enlargement strategy. In these cases, the emphasis is on pre-accession assistance, 
conditionality, and the ability of candidate countries to meet the requirements outlined in 
the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria.”
11  
EIDHR   
In 1994 the European Parliament created the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) as a means to consolidate previously separate budget items 
for the promotion of human rights, democratization and conflict prevention. EIDHR 
provided for the delivery of assistance without host government consent, offering civil 
society organizations an avenue of support even if governments were denied other 
sources of EU funding due to human rights violations. In 1999 the Council passed two 
regulations, 975/1999 and 976/1999 providing a legal basis and overarching framework 
for activities carried out under EIDHR.
12 In May 2001, the Commission adopted a 
communication on the EU's role in promoting human rights and democratization in third 
countries. It underscored a number of important points: the need for a more coherent and 
consistent approach to human rights and democratization; higher prioritization of human 
                                                      
11 To be eligible for membership applicant countries must meet three criteria: political: stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
economic: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union; acceptance of the Community acquis:  the ability to assume the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. For the European 
Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criterion must be satisfied. The EU’s pre-accession 
strategy and accession negotiations provide the framework and instruments for meeting the criteria. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm 
12 Council Regulations 975/1999 and 976/1999 adopted on April 29, 1999, OJ 120/8 of May 8, 1999.   11 
rights and democracy in the EU’s relation with third countries (via diplomacy, trade and 
assistance); a “more strategic approach” to the EIDHR focusing on thematic priorities 
and "target countries" for human rights measures; and mainstreaming its various 
assistance programs (PHARE, TACIS, ALA, MEDA, CARDS, European Development 
Fund).
13  
In 2005-2006, EIDHR launched four thematically focused campaigns to solicit 
proposals for funding: promoting justice and the rule of law, fostering a culture of human 
rights, promoting the democratic process, advancing equality, tolerance and peace. While 
there was no specific reference to transitional justice, each campaign included funding 
opportunities for projects that would unquestionably fall under the rubric of transitional 
justice mechanisms, e.g. international criminal tribunals, conflict resolution via dialogue 
and other peaceful means. Each campaign included selected projects for funding. Global 
projects covered one or more priorities in two or more eligible regions; regional projects 
covered one or more priorities in one eligible region; and national projects covered one or 
more priorities in one eligible country. The budget for 2005-2006 was 106 million Euros 
per year.
14 
In December 2006 the European Council and European Parliament established a 
successor program to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights entitled 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, known by the same acronym 
EIDHR, as a “self-standing” financing instrument for the promotion of democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law in non-EU countries.
15 EIDHR complements other EU 
                                                      
13 European Commission: COMM 2001, 252 Final. 
14 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r10110.htm, accessed January 10, 2009. 
15 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, adopted December 20, 
2006, OJ L 386: 29.12.2006.   12 
programs that promote democracy and the rule of law, including those that provide 
financial and technical co-operation such as the Development Co-operation Instrument 
(DCI), the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for 
pre-Accession (IPA), and the Instrument for Stability (IS). The new instrument reflects 
the EU’s position that human rights and democracy are “global public goods… requiring 
a transnational approach” supported by a commitment to multilateralism.
16  
The scope of the instrument refers to a variety of assistance measures that 
promote and support democratization and human rights, including for the first time since 
the EIDHR framework was launched in 1994, a specific reference to transitional justice 
and other truth and reconciliation mechanisms.  EIDHR’s Strategy Paper for 2007-2010 
outlines five objectives related to democracy and human rights promotion that includes 
several references to transitional justice. For example, Objective 2 calls for 
“strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, 
in facilitating the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political 
participation and representation.”
17  The importance of transitional justice and 
reconciliation is recognized as helping build “consensus on disputed or controversial 
areas of policy in deeply divided society…” In a separate section addressing the issue of 
children in armed conflict, the Strategy Paper draws an explicit link between 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs “and transitional justice 
frameworks, tracing family members, promoting redress and social integration, 
supporting psycho-social rehabilitation programs focused on children…”
18 While 
                                                      
16 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Strategy Paper 2007-2010, DG 
Relex/B/1 JVK 70618, p. 3. 
17 Ibid., p. 8. 
18 Ibid., p. 11.   13 
separating out budget allocations for transitional justice projects is difficult, for the period 
running from 2007-2010 EIDHR has allocated over €208 million for projects covered 
under objective 2, and €7 million to projects involving children and armed conflict. 
EIDHR complements the Instrument for Stability, another critical EU funding program 
that supports transitional justice. 
Instrument for Stability 
  Recognizing the connection between conflict prevention, crisis management and 
peacebuilding, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) began in January 2007 as a successor 
program to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), a civilian analogue to the Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF).
19 It replaced several instruments in the fields of drugs, mines, 
displaced persons, crisis management, rehabilitation and reconstruction. To enhance its 
“crisis response toolbox,”
20 with both long and short term components, the Instrument 
provides economic and technical support with partner countries in contexts of crisis, 
emerging crisis, and stable conditions. In stable contexts the focus is on cooperation and 
capacity building on two fronts: to address global and transregional threats that can 
unleash another wave of instability; and to improve state and non-state actors' 
preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations. In July 2008 the Commission 
drew special attention to the importance of transitional justice in IfS supported projects in 
                                                      
19RRF was established in the wake of the Balkan wars as a mechanism for the rapid deployment troops (60, 
000 in 60 days per the “Headline Goal” of the Helsinki Summit in 1999) to prevent the outbreak of 
violence. RRM was established in February 2001 as a mechanism for quick response to crisis or pre-crisis 
situations to preserve or reestablish civilian structures and institutions for economic, political and social 
stability. It was managed by the Unit for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (CPU) of the DG for 
External Relations. See Regulation( EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
adopted November 15, 2006, OJ L 327: 24.11. 2006; NGO Voice: EU Crisis Management-A Humanitarian 
Perspective, Briefing Paper, Brussels, 2004, p. 4. IfS was conceived of as  supporting the United Nations 
Interim Mission in Kosovo and the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
20 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT-
Annual report from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability in 2007 – Executive 
Summary, Brussels, 11.4.2008, COM(2008) 181 final, p. 4.   14 
its decision to establish a funding facility of € 12 million under the IfS framework for ad-
hoc tribunals and transitional justice initiatives “to encourage reconciliation and help 
build sustainable peace in post crisis situations.”
21 This funding facility allows the 
Commission to rapidly mobilize resources in the form of policy advice, technical, 
logistical and financial assistance in the support individual actions and projects. The IfS 
has supported multiple transitional justice projects, including the International Criminal 
Court, special tribunals and grassroots movements dedicated to ending impunity.
22 In 
2007, the Instrument for Stability supported multiple transitional justice efforts, including 
projects dedicated to conflict-resolution and reconciliation in Haiti, Afghanistan, 
Columbia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Thailand.
23 
  In addition to this initiative, the Instrument for Stability launched a Peace-
Building Partnership (PbP) in November 2007, again with an emphasis on capacity 
building in crisis situations. The primary purpose is to support NGOs in developing early-
warning systems, providing mediation services and spearheading reconciliation processes 
in post-conflict situations. But PbP is also envisioned as collaborative program with other 
IGOs, especially the UN through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
regional organizations, and EU Member State programs dedicated to training for civilian 
stabilization missions.
24  
Instrument for Pre-Accession 
                                                      
21 IP/08/1057, Brussels, 1 July 2008. 
22 Sari Kouvo “Transitional Justice and Institutional Reform: The 4
th Transitional Justice Mechanism,” 
ICTJ Essentials Course on Transitional Justice: The European Experience, Leuven, Belgium, 12-14 
November 2008. 
23 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT-
Annual report from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability in 2007 – Executive 
Summary, Brussels, 11.4.2008, COM(2008) 181 final, p. 8. 
24https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/tariqa/PeaceBuilding/;http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/index_en.htm 
Accessed January 11, 2009.   15 
  In January 2007 the European Commission launched the Instrument for Pre-
accession (IPA) as the Community's financial instrument for the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP).
25 Assistance is provided on the basis of the European 
Partnerships with potential candidate countries and the Accession Partnerships with 
candidate countries, namely, the Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo under UN 
Resolution Security Council Resolution 1244 and Turkey. The IPA provides assistance 
depending on the progress of beneficiary countries and their needs as reported in 
Commission evaluations and annual strategy papers. Assistance is provided to support 
political reform, particularly institution building, strengthening the rule of law, human 
rights, protection of minorities and the development of civil society with a special 
emphasis on transition assistance, institution building, regional and cross-border 
cooperation, human resources and rural development, depending on a country’s status. 
Candidate countries such as Croatia receive funding in all areas, while potential candidate 
countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina receive assistance that is exclusively focused 
on transition assistance, institution building and cross-border cooperation. IPA can 
support a variety of efforts that support the goals of transitional justice. For example, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPA funds have been directed toward judicial reform to support 
to the State Court and the State Prosecutors’ Office to strengthen capacity for the 
prosecution of war crimes;
26 to build the capacity of civil society;
27to address the needs of 
vulnerable groups, including women, children, minorities, those with disabilities and the 
                                                      
25 IPA replaced CARDS, the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation, as 
the EU's main instrument of financial assistance for the Western Balkans. Council Regulation (EC) 
1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) [2006] OJ L210. 
26 Commission Decision C(2008)5659/2 of 09/10/2008 adopting a National Programme (Part I) for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component for 2008. 
27 Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Programme 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina-“Capacity building of 
Civil Society to take part in policy dialogue.”   16 
poor;
28 and to assist with the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced 
persons.
29 
CFSP, ESDP and Transitional Justice  
  The EU’s promotion of transitional justice is not confined to the Community 
Pillar. Indeed, transitional justice is an increasingly important component of the EU’s 
broader foreign and security policy goals. The European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP), established at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, is part of the CFSP that 
emphasizes the development of civilian and military capabilities for international crisis 
management.
30 In June 2000 the European Council in Feira, Portugal initiated a new 
civilian component to ESDP focusing on police (e.g. training, advising, substituting for 
local police forces); strengthening the rule of law (including assistance in reform of 
judicial and penitentiary system); and strengthening civilian administration and civil 
protection. At the Laeken European Council Meeting in December 2001 EDSP was 
pronounced operational, and in 2004 the Council added monitoring as an ESDP priority 
“for conflict prevention/resolution and/or crisis management and/or peacebuilding.”
31  
ESDP is supported by a variety of structures for civilian crisis management.
32 One 
of them, the Political and Security Committee (PSC),
 33 explicitly addressed the 
                                                      
28 Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Programme 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina- Enhancing the Social 
Protection and Inclusion System for Children in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
29Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Plan 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina -Reconstruction of Social and 
Technical Infrastructure facilities (schools, kindergartens, health centers, small bridges, roads etc) in 
support to the sustainable return. 
30 This builds on the Petersburg Tasks outlined at the Western European Union (WEU) conference in 1992 
and include: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making. 
31 EU Council Secretariat-Background-European Security and Defense Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis 
management, May 2007. 
32 According to Renata Dwan, civilian crisis management “is an area where the EU has made the fastest 
operational progress. “ Moreover, she explains that the term “civilian crisis management” has no analog in 
the context of the UN, OSCE or any other regional organizations. See Renata Dwan, “Civilian tasks and   17 
importance of transitional justice in a March 2006 seminar focusing on transitional justice 
in the context of the EU’s crisis management, conflict resolution and peace-building 
activities.
34 The meeting’s draft document acknowledged a gap in the EU’s crisis 
management capabilities and recommended that  ESDP missions “take full account of the 
developing international standards which provide parameters and guidance on policy 
options for justice and accountability, in particular guidelines established by the UN in 
this field.”
35 Harmonizing EU and UN efforts underscores the critical need for 
cooperation between the two organizations, as already evidenced in the area of 
peacebuilding. The evolution of transitional justice in the context of ESDP demonstrates 
that the EU’s and the UN’s goals have largely converged. The EU has, for all intents and 
purposes, followed the UN’s lead.
36 And what the EU cannot or will not do on its own, it 
does in cooperation with other multilateral organizations, including the UN, the OECD
37 
and the Council of Europe, and other regional and multilateral organizations.  
                                                                                                                                                              
capabilities in EU operations,” in Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, eds. A Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 264-265. 
33 Established in January 2001, the PSC meets at the ambassadorial level and is responsible for all CFSP 
issues. Council Decision of 22 January 2001, OJ L 27/1, 30.1.2001. 
34 PSC convened the seminar with subsequent discussions in CIVCOM and PMG about how transitional 
justice could be included in the context of ESDP operations. 
35 Council of the European Union, 10674/06, 19 June 2006. For previous drafts see Council of the 
European Union, 10300/06, 9 June 2006 and Council of the European Union, 10300/1/06 Rev 1, 16 June 
2006. 
36 See Report of the Secretary General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004;  EU Presidency Statement- Statement by H.E. Mr. 
Dirk Jan van den Berg, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations, 
on Behalf of the European Union- The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, October 6, 2004, PRES04-237EN. There are instances, however, where the EU deviates from UN 
policy. EUPM replaced the UN’s own mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina(UNMIBH) in 2003 and did not 
support the idea of a institutionalizing a vetting process to examine the pasts of new police recruits. See 
Case Studies Series: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Developments in Transitional Justice, International 
Center for Transitional Justice, October 2004, p. 13, footnote 57.  
37 This is particularly the case in the area of Security Sector Reform. In this instance the OECD has taken 
the lead through its DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, an international 
forum that brings together conflict prevention and peace-building experts from bilateral and multilateral 
development agencies, including the UN, EU (Commission), IMF and World Bank to address issues of 
security and development , peacebuilding and evaluation. The CPDC is a subsidiary group of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).   18 
The most significant element in the draft document that emerged from the 2006 
seminar recommended the inclusion of transitional justice mechanisms during the 
planning phases of ESDP operations, including criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations programs, and vetting.
38  It proposed that planners carefully consider “the exit 
strategy for an ESDP operation and the continuing situation on the ground following the 
departure of an ESDP operation.” In other words, winning the peace should be central to 
planning ESDP operations and that requires a careful examination of the situation on the 
ground and tailoring transitional justice activities to meet tangible needs before a mission 
is deployed.  In order to effectively do so, the EU must generate its own transitional 
justice expertise; train its personnel in the area of transitional justice to support future 
crisis management operations; develop guidelines for ESDP missions consistent with UN 
standards in the area of transitional justice; and integrate transitional justice concerns in 
the mandates of EU Special Representatives.
39  
The 2006 Presidency Report on ESDP highlighted once again the need to develop 
transitional justice approaches in the context of ESDP missions.
40 And more recently, in 
2008 the General Secretariat of the Council issued a compilation of public documents 
addressing the issue of mainstreaming human rights and gender into ESDP. It includes 
the draft document from the PSC’s 2006 seminar, signaling perhaps that concern about 
transitional justice is not fleeting, but rather a topic of ongoing discussion linked to 
                                                      
38 Council of the European Union, 10674/06, 19 June 2006, p. 3. 
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Presidency Report on ESDP, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 12 June 2006.   19 
broader, cross-cutting concerns about mainstreaming human rights and gender 
perspectives into ESDP missions.
41 
ESDP missions focus on establishing secure environments where the rule of law 
and human rights are respected. Thus, all of them contribute, in one way or another, to 
the promotion of transitional justice, whether through specific ESDP mission tasks such 
as security sector reform, vetting, reform of judicial system, or by building a safe and 
secure environment for the EU to implement its communitarized cooperation programs, 
such as EIDHR.
42  Indeed, many aspects of civilian crisis management in ESDP 
mandates overlap with first-pillar initiatives underscoring once again that the EU’s 
promotion of transitional justice is a cross-pillar endeavor.  
Transitional Justice, ESDP and Enlargement: The Case of Bosnia Herzegovina 
In 2003 the EU launched its first two ESDP civilian crisis management missions: 
the EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) and the EU Police Mission in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macendonia (PROXIMA).
43 There are currently thirteen 
ESDP missions around the world. Seven qualify as civilian crisis management missions, 
with varying mandates centering on police, rule of law, and/or security sector reform.
44 
These include EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM); EU Integrated Rule of 
Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX); EU security sector reform mission in the 
                                                      
41 Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defence Policy, General 
Secretariat of the Council, 2008. 
42 Avello, p. 7 refers to this as the EU’s “indirect” promotion of transitional justice.  
43 PROXIMA was completed in December 2005. For details about EUPM see Stefano Recchia, Beyond 
International Trusteeship: EU Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Occasional Paper no. 66 (Paris: 
EUISS, February 2007). 
44 Police missions cover several areas, including assistance and training and to replace local forces where 
they are lacking; Rule of law missions are dedicated to the reform and strengthening local legal/judicial 
systems; security sector reform missions are multifaceted, and can include the military, police, judicial 
system, penal institutions, intelligence services, border guards, as well as irregular forces, e.g. non-state 
paramilitary organizations, guerilla forces, and liberation armies.   20 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO); EU Police Mission for the 
Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL 
AFGHANISTAN); EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau 
(EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)
45; European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX 
KOSOVO). (See Table 1)  
The EU’s promotion of transitional justice in the context of ESDP missions 
warrants further amplification.  Currently, three ESDP civilian missions, European Union 
Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM), EU Military Operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), and the European Union rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX KOSOVO)
46 blend transitional justice concerns with enlargement and preparing 
potential candidate countries for future admission to the EU.
47 I briefly focus here on the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The EU’s support for transitional justice mechanisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) is animated by two, interrelated impulses: peace-building via ESDP and 
enlargement, with the former providing essential, indeed indispensible, support for the 
latter.
48  In terms of peace-building, there are currently two ESDP missions in BiH, both 
of which have mandates that incorporate transitional justice concerns. Launched in 
                                                      
45 This mission follows the guidelines of the “Africa-EU Strategic Partnership” adopted at the EU-Africa 
summit in Lisbon, Portugal in 2007. See 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080604Guinea-Bissau2_EN.pdf; Accessed January 10, 
2009. Demonstrating the cross-pillar quality of such operations, the mission complements the activities 
under the European Commission's Instrument for Stability (IfS). 
46 EULEX is the largest ESDP mission to date.  
47 European Union Military Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR 
Concordia), March 31, 2003–December 15, 2003; European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), December 15, 2003–December 14,  2005; the EU Police 
Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT), December 15, 2005–June 14,  
2006. The  completed civilian and military missions in Macedonia fall into this category as well.  In 
contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is considered a candidate 
country. 
48 See Rangelov and Theros, “Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” p. 367.   21 
January 2003, European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) replaced 
the UN-led International Police Task Force (IPTF). It was the first ESDP mission with a 
focus on police reform and enhancing the rule of law in an effort to build a professional 
and multi-ethnic police force in accordance with European and international standards.  
In December 2004 the European Council established the EU Military Operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) in December 2004 with an initial force level of 7,000 
troops.
49  As stability has returned to the region force levels have consistently declined. 
As of this writing, approximately 2,000 troops serve in EUFOR. Both missions 
emphasize predominantly judicial mechanisms of transitional justice. Indeed, EUFOR’s 
main purpose is to support the ICTY and local authorities in the detention of persons 
indicted for war crimes.  EUPM has indirectly supported the ICTY’s mission in the 
reform of the police, but stopped short of implementing any further transitional justice 
measures such as vetting. As noted above, EUPM succeeded the UN-led IPTF which was 
part of the larger UN Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH). Between 199-2002 UNMIBH vetted 
approximately 24,000 police officers. But its success has been questioned, both by the 
public and by former officers.
50 Moreover, once EUPM replaced UNMIBH it did not put 
new recruits through a similar vetting process and indeed abjured from instituting new 
                                                      
49Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004. Operation ALTHEA was launched following a 
decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR (Stabilization Force) Operation. UN Security Council Resolution 
1575 authorizes the deployment of an EU force in BiH under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure 
continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement and to help build a safe and secure environment in 
BiH.  EUFOR’s primary contribution to transitional justice is in providing support to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the pursuit of persons indicted for war crimes, 
although 
responsibility for full cooperation with ICTY rests not with EUFOR but with Bosnian authorities. See EU 
Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081204%20Factsheet%20EUFOR%20Althea%20-
%20version%2013_EN.pdf 
50Freeman, Mark. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Developments in Transitional Justice. ICTJ Case 
Studies Series. New York: International Center for Transitional Justice. October 2004, p. 13.   22 
vetting processes or guidelines.
51 Police with questionable pasts remained on the police 
force and EUPM has shown little eagerness to address this lingering concern. 
Nonetheless, it appears that progress was made to reform the police, particularly in the 
areas of quality and trust. A survey conducted in 2005/2006 by Oxford Research 
International for the UNDP found that Bosnians have come to trust the police more than 
other national or international institutions.
52 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future membership prospects in the EU provide a 
second set of motivations for promoting transitional justice. The Thessaloniki European 
Council meeting in 2003 established a framework for the eventual membership of Balkan 
countries with the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
53 It was only in 2008, 
however, that the EU and BiH signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA)
54, the first step in a much longer process to assist and assess potential candidate 
countries in building the capacity necessary for them to successfully adopt and implement 
EU law. To achieve its goals for membership, BiH must successfully demonstrate its 
commitment to the Copenhagen Criteria, the political, economic and institutional 
requirements for candidate countries. The Criteria emphasize the importance of 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities. In 
addition, there are special conditions for SAP in this region, including full cooperation 
with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), the 
establishment of mechanism for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
                                                      
51 Ibid.  See also Rangelov and Theros, p. 361, 371. 
52 Cited in International Crisis Group, Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe, 
Europe Report No. 198, March 9, 2009, p. 11.  
53 See The Council of the European Union, Thessaloniki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1 
October 2003, 11638/03, pp. 12-13;  
54 2008/211/EC: Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing Decision 2006/55/EC,  
Official Journal L 080 , 19/03/2008 P. 0018 – 0031   23 
respect for human and minority rights, and a pledge to regional cooperation. Thus, when 
it comes to the issue of EU enlargement and the accession of new members, transitional 
justice is coupled with the concept of conditionality. Theoretically, if BiH fails to make 
good on the requirements of the SAA and the Copenhagen Criteria, including those that 
either implicitly or explicitly trigger the need for transitional justice mechanisms, its 
aspiration for membership will be delayed, if not derailed entirely. 
Some scholars argue that the emphasis on criminal prosecutions at the ICTY, 
particularly in the context of SAP and conditionality, has “dominated” transitional justice 
concerns at the expense of domestic approaches (Rangelov and Theros 2009: 368).  It 
should be noted, however, that truth seeking and other local or domestic approaches, such 
as reconciliation initiatives, educational reform, repatriation of refugees, and 
memorialization are frequently and generously supported under communitarized first 
pillar financing instruments, particularly EIDHR.
55 What is certainly open to debate, 
however, is how important transitional justice concerns are to the EU’s broader 
engagement in Bosnia and Herzgovina, particularly when it comes to the issue of future 
accession. To be sure, the EU increasingly acknowledges the importance of transitional 
justice in the context of peace-building. The bigger question is whether the EU is tone 
deaf  to a more “justice-sensitive approach” to enlargement that more assertively 
promotes the need to confront the past in an effort to move forward.
56  
                                                      
55 EIDHR has supported multiple programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina dedicated to domestically focused 
truth and reconciliation efforts, education, tolerance, memorialization, the protection of minority rights. See 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 2000-2006, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/documents/eidhr_compendium_by_project_theme_fi
nal_15_09_08_en.pdf 
56 Rangelov and Theros underscore this point repeatedly in their analysis of EU transitional justice efforts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The International Crisis Group notes that conditionality is a powerful tool at 
the EU’s disposal, but its utility is not limitless and “should be applied with a delicate mixture of flexibility   24 
Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but the intense focus 
on the ICTY in the context of ESDP may in part be explained by both its high profile,
57 
including its international backing, and the decision-making process whereby missions 
are established, namely at the Council level where individual state interests play more of 
a role and consensus is often reached by a series of compromises. In terms of the latter, 
varying levels of political will to “do more” and the different levels of importance that 
member states attach to transitional justice complicate the tasks of integrating such 
concerns even more explicitly into ESDP mandates and then implementing them in the 
field. By contrast, aid programs that are directed from the Commission are less 
politicized in the sense that individual member states have a far more muted voice. 
Regardless, this example demonstrates that transitional justice is now an integral 
component of both peace-building and enlargement interests in the Balkans. Yet it also 
underscores that despite rhetorical commitments to do more and to be more systematic 
about it, the EU’s promotion of transitional justice is often bedeviled by different agendas 
and modes of decision-making across the pillar structure, raising concerns about 
operational coherence and the long-term prospects for transitional justice in the region. 
 
 
Transitional Justice, ESDP and the EU’s External Relations: The Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
 
In contrast to ESDP missions in Europe’s wider backyard, in places where the 
issues of peace-building and enlargement are often intertwined, ESDP missions in Africa, 
                                                                                                                                                              
and firmness, because it can easily misfire…” See Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and 
Europe, p. 20, footnote, 186. 
57 Natascha Zupan describes the ICTY as “one of the key—if not the key-transitional justice mechanism” in 
the former Yugoslavia. See Zupan, “Facing the Pact and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former 
Yugoslavia,” p. 328.   25 
Asia and elsewhere are focused more on deploying the EU’s crisis management 
capabilities to further its broader external relations goals. Several of these missions put 
SSR at the center of the mission. Increasingly, transitional justice and SSR are viewed as 
mutually supporting methodologies in post-conflict situations, particularly when it comes 
to issues related to judicial systems, police, correctional systems, the military, and the 
supervision of such institutions (Mobekk: 2006, 5). Indeed, they share similar goals: 
accountability for past crimes, capacity building to strengthen the rule of law, and 
deterrence (Mobekk: 2005, 6). Security sector reform frequently includes the practice of 
vetting to reestablish integrity and rule of law in security focused institutions.  
The ICTJ recognizes the importance of what it calls “justice-sensitive SSR” as a 
means to deter future human rights abuses and to promote the rule of law. Justice-
sensitive SSR rests on several points: building institutional integrity and legitimacy in the 
security sector to overcome the distrust that is prevalent in societies with legacies of 
abuse; empowering citizens; and enhancing coherence with other transitional justice 
mechanisms.
58 According to recently issued OECD guidelines, SSR is not just a series of 
technical procedures and actions, but “has an explicitly political objective—to ensure that 
security and justice are provided in a manner consistent with democratic norms, human 
rights principles and the rule of law.”
59 Security sector reform and human security go 
hand in hand. Justice sensitive SSR programs aim to turn institutions that are supposed to 
protect the population into protectors and to end what are often deeply ingrained patterns 
of abuse and violence. If successful, SSR programs can facilitate the implementation of 
                                                      
58 http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/783.html 
59 DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD/DAC Security System Reform, 2005, p. 21.   26 
other transitional justice measures to address issues of accountability, e.g. criminal trials, 
truth-seeking efforts, reparations. 
One of the EU’s more ambitious efforts on the SSR front is its security sector 
reform is taking place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where there are 
two EDSP missions with mandates to support SSR in two key areas: the EU Police 
Mission in the DRC (EUPOL RD CONGO)
60 and the EU Security Sector Reform 
Mission in the DRC (EUSEC RD CONGO)
61. EUPOL RD CONGO provides advice on 
reforming the police (the PNC -Police Nationale Congolaise) and improving relations 
between the police and criminal justice system. EUSEC RD CONGO focuses much of its 
efforts on assisting Congolese authorities with the tasks of integrating, restructuring and 
rebuilding the Congolese army. Both missions are facing the complicated tasks of 
reforming and rebuilding a security sector that was never designed to protect the 
population and, in fact, is often the source of serious abuse and violence directed at the 
people.
62 To supplement the peacebuilding tasks of the ESDP missions, a range of 
funding instruments and technical assistance are provided in communitarized EU 
programs, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), and more recently, the 
Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP).
63  
 
 
Conclusion  
                                                      
60 Council Joint Action 2008/485/CFSP, June 2008. 
61 Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, May 2005. 
62 Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Initiative for Peacebuilding, February 2009, p. 15. 
63 Ibid., p. 28.   27 
Civilian crisis management is a central focus of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) and is now considered the “core” of a human security based 
approach (Dwan 2006: 265). Increasingly, the most overt expression of the EU’s support 
for transitional justice occurs in the context of EDSP, but without additional support 
provided by communitarized programs “winning the peace” would be that much more 
difficult. In examining how the EU’s ESDP capabilities and missions have evolved, as 
well its first pillar instruments dedicated to the promotion of democracy, development 
and human rights, we observe an expanding EU international role that explicitly 
integrates the importance of ethical and normative concerns in formulating foreign 
policy, particularly in the areas of human rights and the security of individuals. Such 
concerns animate, indeed permeate, the EU’s newly launched efforts in the area of 
transitional justice. The ethical power Europe model emphasizes what the EU does, and 
what the EU does in promoting transitional justice is to help establish the conditions for 
legitimate political authority, legitimate institutions, and the rule of law, all of which are 
preconditions for ensuring human security. (Table 2) 
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Table 1: CURRENT CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ESDP OPERATIONS 
Operation Name  Mandate/Objective  Type 
EUPM 
(Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
“to establish effective policing arrangements under BiH 
ownership in accordance with the best European and 
international practice. EUPM aims through mentoring, 
monitoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, 
professional and multiethnic police service in BiH.”
64 
Police 
EUJUST LEX 
(Iraq) 
“to strengthen the rule of law and promote a culture of respect 
for human rights in Iraq”
65 
Rule of 
Law 
EUPOL COPPS 
(Palestinian 
Territories) 
“to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective 
policing arrangements and to advise Palestinian counterparts 
on Criminal Justice related aspects under Palestinian ownership 
in accordance with the best international standards, in co-
operation with the EU institution building programmes 
conducted by the European Commission as well as other 
international efforts in the wider context of security sector 
including criminal justice reform.”
66 
Police 
EUSEC RD 
CONGO  
 
“provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in 
charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that 
are compatible with human rights and international 
humanitarian law, gender issues and children affected by 
armed conflicts, democratic standards, principles of good 
public management, transparency and observance of the rule of 
law”
67 
Security 
Sector 
Reform 
EUPOL 
AFGHANISTAN 
“to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective 
civil policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate 
interaction with the wider criminal justice system under 
Afghan ownership.”
68 
Police 
 
EU SSR Guinea-
Bissau 
“provide the local authorities with advice and assistance on 
SSR in order to contribute to creating the conditions for 
implementation of the National SSR Strategy (adopted by the 
authorities of Guinea-Bissau and endorsed by the international 
donors round table for Guinea-Bissau at its meeting in 
November 2006), in close cooperation with other EU, 
international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating 
subsequent donor engagement.”
69 
Security 
Sector 
Reform 
EULEX 
KOSOVO 
“to support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring 
and advising on all areas related to the rule of law, in particular 
in the police, judiciary, customs and correctional services.”
70 
Rule of 
Law 
                                                      
64 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081029-FACTSHEET_EUPM-version5_EN.pdf 
65 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=823&lang=en 
66http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090121FACTSHEETEUPOLCOPPSversion11_EN.pdf 
67 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=en 
68http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081208FACTSHEET_EUPOL_Afghanistan-v13_EN.pdf .  
69 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080604Guinea-Bissau2_EN.pdf 
70http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081216%20FACTSHEET%20EULEX%20Kosovo%20-
%20version%205_EN.pdf This is the largest civilian mission to date, with 1300 international and 500 local staff.   29 
Table 2: EUROPEAN UNION TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
  Pillar I: Community Pillar/Commission 
Instrument/ 
Mechanism 
 
EIDHR  IfS  PbP  IPA 
Oversight/ 
Management 
DG Relex  DG Relex  DG Relex  DG 
Enlargement 
Activities  strengthening the 
rule of law; 
civil society 
dialogues; 
reconciliation 
efforts;  
Disarmament, 
Demoblization 
Reintegration 
(DDR); 
promoting redress 
Ad hoc 
tribunals; 
Support for 
ICC; 
Reconciliation 
efforts; 
Conflict-
resolution 
efforts 
Reconciliation 
efforts 
institution 
building; 
strengthening 
the rule of 
law; human 
rights, 
protection of 
minorities; 
development 
of civil 
society 
 
 
  Pillar II:CFSP/European Council 
Instrument/Mechanism  ESDP 
 
 
Oversight/Management  PSC, CIVCOM 
 
 
Activities  Security Sector Reform (SSR); 
Strengthening the rule of law; 
Strengthening institutions of civilian administration; 
Disarmament, Demoblization Reintegration (DDR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References   30 
ADAMS, K. (1993) What is Just? The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of 
Former East German Border Guards. Stanford Journal of International Law 29: 
271-314. 
AGGESTAM, L. (2004) A European foreign policy? Role conceptions and the politics of
  identity in Britain, France and Germany. Stockholm: Akademitryck. 
-----. (2008) Introduction: Ethical Power in Europe? International Affairs 84: 1-11. 
AKHAVEN, P. (1998) Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. Human Rights 
Quarterly 20: 737-816. 
ARRIAZA, L. AND N. ROHT-ARRIAZA. (2008) Social Reconstruction as a Local 
Process. International Journal of Transitional Justice 2: 152-172. 
ASMAL, K. (1992) Victims, Survivors and Citizens: Human Rights, Reparations and
  Reconciliation. South African Journal on Human Rights 8: 491-511. 
AVELLE, M.  (2008) European efforts in Transitional Justice. Working Paper 58, 
Madrid:FRIDE, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior. 
BAINES, E. (2007) The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and 
Reconciliation in Northern Uganda. International Journal of Transitional Justice 
1: 91-114. 
BARKAN, E. (2001) The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical 
Injustices. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
BARSALOU, J, AND V. BAXTER. (2007) The Urge to Remember: The Role of 
Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional Justice. In Stabilization and
  Reconstruction. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 
BASSIOUNI, C. (1996) Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
  Accountability. Law and Contemporary Problems 59: 9-28. 
-----. (2002) The United Nations Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia. In Post-Conflict 
Justice, edited by M. C. Bassiouni. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers. 
BELL, C., C. CAMPBELL AND F. NI AOLÁIN. (2004) Justice Discourses in 
Transition. Social and Legal Studies 13: 305-328. 
BELL, C. AND C. O'ROURKE. (2007) Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional 
Justice? An Introductory Essay. International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 
(1):23-44. 
BENOMAR, J. (1993) Justice after Transitions. Journal of Democracy 4: 3-14. 
BERAT, L. (1993) Prosecuting Human Rights Violators From a Predecessor Regime.
  Guidelines for a Transformed South Africa. Boston College Third World Law 
Journal 13:199-231. 
BERAT, L, AND Y. SHAIN. (1995) Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa?
  Legacies of the Transitional Phase. Law and Social Inquiry 20: 163-189. 
BLANKENBURG, E. (1995) Purge of Lawyers after the Breakdown of the East German 
Communist Regime. Law and Social Inquiry 20: 223-244. 
BOED, R. (2000) The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to 
Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations. Cornell 
 International Law Journal 33: 297-330.   31 
BOETTKE, P. AND C. COYNE. The Political Economy of Forgiveness. Society 44: 53 
59. 
BUERGENTHAL, T. (1994) The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador. 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 27: 498-544. 
CARDENAL, R. (1992) Justice in Post-Cold War El Salvador: The Role of the Truth 
Commission. Journal of Third World Studies 9: 313-338. 
CASSEL, D. W. Jr. (1993) International Truth Commissions and Justice. Aspen Institute 
Quarterly 5: 77-90. 
CEPL, W. (1993) Lustration in the CSFR: Ritual Sacrifices. East European 
Constitutional Review 1: 24-26. 
COHEN, S. (1995) State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and 
the Policing of the Past. Law and Social Inquiry 20: 7-50. 
COUILLARD, V. (2007) The Nairobi Declaration: Redefining Reparation for Women 
Victims of Sexual Violence. International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 
(3):444-453. 
CROCKER, D. (2000) Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society. In 
Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by R. I. Rotberg and 
D.Thompson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
CROSSLEY-FROLICK. K. (2007) Scales of Justice: The Vetting of Former East 
German Police and Teachers in Saxony 1990-1993. German Studies Review, 
30:141-162. 
DALY, E. (2002) Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 34: 355-
396. 
DAVID, R. (2003) Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and the Evaluation of the 
Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland. Law and Social Inquiry 28: 
387-439. 
-----.(2006) From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political Effects. 
Government and Opposition 41: 347-372. 
DAVIS, L. (2009) Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Initiative for Peacebuilding. 
DE GREIFF, P. (2009) DDR and Reparations: Establishing Links Between Peace and 
Justice Instruments. In Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies of 
Transitional Justice, Peace and Development, edited by K. Ambos et.al. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.  
-----. (2007) Justice and Reparations. In Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, 
edited by J. Miller and R. Kumar. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
DHUNGANA. S. (2007) Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal. 3: 70-78. 
DU BOIS-PEDAIN, A. (2007) Transitional Amnesty in South Africa. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
DÛCHENE, F. (1972) Europe’s Role in World Peace. In Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen 
Europeans Look Ahead. London: Fontana. 
DUTHIE, R. (2008) Toward a Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice. 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2: 292-309. 
ELLIS, M. (1996) Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former 
Communist Bloc. Law and Contemporary Problems 59: 181-196.   32 
ENSALACO, M. (1994) Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and 
Assessment. Human Rights Quarterly 16: 656-675. 
GLASIUS, M. AND M. KALDOR (2006) A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: 
Project,Principles, Practicalities. London: Routledge. 
GOLDSTONE, R. (1996) Justice As a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals. New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 28: 485-503. 
-----. (1997) The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment. Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 12: 227-240. 
HAMBER, B. (2007) Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay. 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1: 375-390. 
HÄNGGI, H. AND F. TANNER (2005) Promoting Security Sector Governance in the 
EU’s Neighbourhood. Challiot Paper no. 80. 
HAYNER, P.B. (1994) Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study. 
Human Rights Quarterly 16: 597-655. 
-----. (1996) International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of Truth 
Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal. Law and Contemporary Problems 59: 
173-180. 
-----. (2002) Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
JELIN, E. (2007) Public Memorialization in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of 
Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America. International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 1: 138-156. 
KAGAN, R. (2003) Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order. New York: Knopf. 
KALDOR, M., M. MARTIN, AND S. SELCHOW (2007) Human Security: A New 
Strategic Narrative for Europe, International Affairs 83: 273-288. 
KAREKEZI, A., A. NSHIMIYIMANA, AND B. MUTAMBA. (2005) Localizing 
Justice: Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda. In My Neighbor, My Enemy: 
Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, edited by E. Stover and 
H. M.Weinstein. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
KNIGHT, M. AND A. ÖZERDEM (2004) Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War 
to Peace. Journal of Peace Research 41: 499-516. 
LETKI, N. (2002) Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe. Europe-Asia 
Studies 54: 529-552. 
LEVINSON, S. (1998) Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
LODEN, A. (2007) Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: 
Painting a Moving Train without Brushes. International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 1: 297-307. 
LOS, M. (1995) Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe. 
Law and Social Inquiry 20: 117-162. 
LUNDY, P. AND M. MCGOVERN (2008) Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional 
Justice From the Bottom-Up. Journal of Law and Society 35: 265-292. 
MANNERS, I. (2006) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of   33 
Common Market Studies 40: 235-258. 
MARXEN, K. (1996) The Legal Limitations of Amnesty. In Confronting Past Injustices: 
Approaches to Amnesty, Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa 
and Germany, edited by M. R. Rwelamira and G. Werle. Durban, South Africa: 
Butterworths. 
MATHESON, M. (2002) United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies: East 
Timor and Kosovo. In Post-Conflict Justice, edited by M. C. Bassiouni. Ardsley, 
NY: Transnational Publishers. 
MATLARY, J. (2008)  Much Ado About Little: the EU and Human Security,” 
International Affairs 84: 131-143.  
MAULL, H. (1990) Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. Foreign Affairs 69: 
91-106.  
-----. (2000) German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power?’ German
  Politics 9: 1-24. 
MENDELOFF, D. (2004) Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: 
Curb the Enthusiasm? International Studies Review 6: 355-380. 
MILLER, Z. (2008) Expanding TJ Theory and Practice Effects of Invisibility: In Search 
of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice. International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2: 266-291. 
MITZEN, J. (2006) Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and 
Ontological Security. Journal of European Public Policy 13: 270-285. 
MOBBEK, E. (2006) Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform: Enabling 
Sustainable Peace. Occasional Paper #13.Geneva: DCAF. 
NAGY, R. (2008) Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections. Third
  World Quarterly 29: 275-289. 
NAIDU, E. (2006) The Ties That Bind: Strengthening the Links Between 
Memorialisation and Transitional Justice. In Transitional Justice Programme 
Research Brief: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 
NI AOLÁIN, F. (2006) Political Violence and Gender During Times of Transition. 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law. 15: 829-850. 
NI AOLÁIN, F. AND E. ROONEY. (2007) Underenforcement and Intersectionality: 
Gendered Aspects of Transition for Women. International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 1: 338-354. 
NINO, C. (1991) The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context:
  The Case of Argentina. Yale Law Journal 100: 2619-2640.  
----. (1996) Radical Evil on Trial. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
OFFE, C. (1993) Disqualification, Retribution, Restitution: Dilemmas of Justice in Post
  Communist Transitions. Journal of Political Philosophy 1:17-44. 
ORENTLICHER, D. (1991) Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Right
  Violations of a Prior Regime. Yale Law Journal 100: 2537-2615. 
-----. (1997) Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Crimes. ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 3: 713-718. 
PARKER, K. AND J. CHEW. (1994) Compensation for Japan's World War II War-Rape
  Victims. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17: 497-550.   34 
PASQUALUCCI, J.M. (1994) The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth
  Commissions, Impunity, and the Inter-American Human Rights System. Boston
  University International Law Journal 12: 321-370. 
PAYNE, L. (2007) Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions 
of State Violence. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
RANGELOV, I. AND M. THEROS (2009) Transitional Justice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Coherence and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil 
Society.  In Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional 
Justice, Peace and Development, edited by Kai Ambos, Judith Large and Marieke 
Wierda. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, N. (1990) State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave 
Human Rights Violations in International Law. California Law Review 78: 449-
514. 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, N. and L. GIBSON. (1998) The Developing Jurisprudence on 
Amnesty. Human Rights Quarterly 20: 843-885. 
RUBIO-MARÍN, R. AND P. DE GREIFF. (2007) Women and Reparations. 
International  Journal of Transitional Justice 1: 318-337. 
SADAT, L. (2006) Exile, Amnesty and International Law. Notre Dame Law Review 81: 
955-1036. 
SOUTHERN, D. (1993) Restitution or Compensation: The Land Question in East
  Germany.International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42: 690-697. 
SHAW, R. (2007) Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone. International Journal of Transitional Justice 1: 183-
207. 
SJURSEN, H. (2006a) What Kind of Power? Journal of European Public Policy 13: 169 
181. 
 -----. (2006b) The EU as a “Normative” Power: How Can This Be? Journal of 
European Public Policy 13: 235-251. 
STAHN, C. (2002) United Nations Peacebuilding, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of 
Justice: A Change in Practice? International Review of the Red Cross 84: 191-
205. 
STAVRIDIS, S. (2001) Militarizing the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe 
Revisited. The International Spectator 35: 11-28. 
STINCHCOMBE, A. (1995) The Problems of Lustration: Prosecution of Wrongdoers by
  Democratic Successor Regimes. Law and Social Inquiry 20: 1-6. 
STROHMEYER, H. (2001a) “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The 
United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor,” American Journal of 
International Law. 95: 46–63.  
-----. (2001b)  Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the Creation of 
Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs 25: 107. 
TEITEL, R. (2003) Transitional Justice Genealogy. Harvard Human Rights Journal 16: 
69-94. 
THALLINGER, G. (2007) The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional 
Justice. German Law Journal 8: 681-710.   35 
THEIDON, K. (2006) Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in 
Postwar Peru. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50: 433-457. 
-----. (2007) Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
for Former Combatants in Columbia. International Journal of Transitional Justice 
1: 66-90. 
TOLBERT, D. AND A. SOLOMON (2006) United Nations Reform and Supporting the 
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 19: 29-
62. 
VAN ZYL, P. (1999) Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. Journal of International Affairs 52: 647-667. 
WALDORF, L. (2006) Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as
  Transitional Justice. Temple Law Review 79: 1-87. 
WELSH, H. (1996) Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European
  Experiences after 1990. Europe-Asia Studies 48: 413-428. 
WESCHLER, L. (1990) A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers. New 
York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
WILSON, S. (2001) The Myth of Restorative Justice: Truth, Reconciliation and the 
Ethics of Amnesty. South African Journal on Human Rights 17: 531-562.  
WUHLER, N. (1999) The United Nations Compensation Commission. In State 
Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of 
Human Rights, edited by A. Randelzhofer and C. Tomuschat. The Hague, 
Netherlands: Martin Nijhoff Publishers. 
ZUPAN, N. (2006) Facing the Past and Transitional Justice in Countries of Former 
Yugoslavia. In Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, edited by 
M. Fischer. Münster: Lit Verlag. 
 
 
 
 